Random audits could shift the incentive for researchers from quantity to quality

Barnett, Adrian (2018) Random audits could shift the incentive for researchers from quantity to quality [Online resource]
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The drive to publish papers has created a hyper-competitive research environment in which researchers who take care to produce relatively few high-quality papers are out-competed by those who cut corners so their bibliometrics look good. Adrian Barnett suggests one way to push back against the pressure to "publish or perish" is to randomly audit a small proportion of researchers and take time to assess their research in detail. Auditors could examine complex measures of quality which no metric could ever capture such as originality, reproducibility, and research translation. Concern over the possibility of being audited would also encourage good research practice across the community.


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