Why stare decisis?
Felli, L., Anderlini, L. & Riboni, A.
(2011).
Why stare decisis?
(CEPR Discussion papers 8266).
Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
All Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are sunk. This might generate a time-inconsistency problem. From an ex-ante perspective, Courts will have the (ex-post) temptation to be excessively lenient. This observation is at the root of the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis forces Courts to weigh the benefits of leniency towards the current parties against the beneficial effects that tougher decisions have on future ones. We study these dynamics and find that stare decisis guarantees that precedents evolve towards ex-ante efficient decisions, thus alleviating the Courts’ time-inconsistency problem. However, the dynamics do not converge to full efficiency
| Item Type | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2011 The Authors |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD LSE > Research Centres > Financial Markets Group |
| Date Deposited | 12 Apr 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/35485 |
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- http://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/people/faculty/leonardo-felli.aspx (Author)
- https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8266 (Related item)
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- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/79957627537 (Scopus publication)
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