Felli, Leonardo

Number of items: 67.
Article
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni (2019). Costly pretrial agreements. Journal of Legal Studies, 48(1), 159 - 188. https://doi.org/10.1086/699841
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (2018). Firm-specific training. Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 585-623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.010
  • Felli, Leonardo, Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2016). Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 11(3), 279-312. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015060
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin (2015). Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Economica, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12170
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Riboni, Alessandro (2014). Why stare decisis? Review of Economic Dynamics, 17(4), 726 - 738. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2014.02.001
  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Felli, Leonardo, Yariv, Leeat (2014). Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(3), 133-158. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.6.3.133
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni, Riboni, Alessandro (2013). Legal institutions, innovation, and growth. International Economic Review, 54(3), 937-956. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12023
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2011). Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? Review of Law and Economics, 7(1), 15 - 29. https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1492
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Riboni, A. (2008). Statute law or case law? Mimeo, 1-31.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2007). Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23(3), 662-684. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm018
  • Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio (2007). If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(2-3), 624-635.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Al-Najjar, Nabil (2006). Undescribable events. Review of Economic Studies, 73(4), 849-868. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00399.x
  • Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio (2006). Endogenous lobbying. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(1), 180-215. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2006.4.1.180
  • Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca (2006). Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem. The Economic Journal, 116(508), 223-245. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01054.x
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2004). Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts. Research in Economics, 58(1), 3-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2003.12.001
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2004). Book review: economics and language: five essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. Economica, 71(281), 169-171. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.363_2.x
  • Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca (2001). Costly bargaining and renegotiation. Econometrica, 69(2), 377-411. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00196
  • Felli, Leonardo, Villas-Boas, J. Miguel (2000). Renegotiation and collusion in organizations. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 453-483. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00453.x
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1999). Incomplete contracts and complexity costs. Theory and Decision, 46(1), 23-50. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004917722235
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Describability and agency problems. European Economic Review, 42(1), 35-59. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00062-1
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (1997). Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures. European Economic Review, 41(3-5), 475-485. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00009-3
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (1996). A note on G. Bertola and L. Felli (1993) “Job matching and the distribution of surplus” Ricerche Economiche, 47, 65–92. Ricerche Economiche, 50(3), 317-319. https://doi.org/10.1006/reco.1996.0020
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (1996). Learning, wage dynamics, and firm-specific human capital. Journal of Political Economy, 104(4), 838-868. https://doi.org/10.1086/262044
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1994). Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1085-1124. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118357
  • Bertola, G., Felli, Leonardo (1993). Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus. Ricerche Economiche, 47(1), 65-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/0035-5054(93)90025-X
  • Diamond, Peter, Felli, Leonardo (1993). Search, sticky prices and deflation. Mimeo,
  • Felli, Leonardo (1993). Turnovers and asymptotic behavior of workers. Economics Letters, 42(1), 43-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90171-8
  • Felli, Leonardo, Ichino, Andrea (1988). Do marginal employment subsidies increase re-employment probabilities? Labour, 2(3), 63-89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9914.1988.tb00140.x
    • Chapter
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2008). Agency problems. In Durlauf, S. N. & Blume, L. E. (Eds.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics . Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2007). Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem. In Cafaggi, F., Nicita, A. & Pagano, U. (Eds.), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions . Routledge.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin (2000). Competition and hold-ups. In Atkinson, T., Glennerster, H. & Stern, N. (Eds.), Putting Economics to Work : Volume in Honour of Michio Morishima (pp. 31-70). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (1995). The theory of bankruptcy and mechanism design. In Eichengreen, B. & Portes, R. (Eds.), Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors (pp. 69-86). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
    • Working paper
  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Felli, Leonardo, Yariv, Leeat (2013). Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Riboni, Alessandro (2011). Why stare decisis? (CEPR Discussion papers 8266). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Felli, Leonardo, Koenen, Johannes, Stahl, Konrad O (2011). Competition and trust: evidence from German car manufacturers. (CEPR discussion papers 8265). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2010). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Felli, Leonardo, Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Yariv, Leeat (2010). Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. (NBER working paper series 16444). National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Immordino, Giovanni, Riboni, Alessandro (2010). Legal institutions, innovation and growth. (CESF working papers 256). University of Naples.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2006). Active courts and menu contracts. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2006). Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (STICERD Discussion Papers TE/06/510). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines. picture_as_pdf
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (2006). Firm-specific training. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2004). Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (CEPR Discussion Papers DP4197). Center for Economic Policy Research.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2003). Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (STICERD Discussion Papers TE/2003/464). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines. picture_as_pdf
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2003). Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio (2003). Endogenous lobbying. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin W. S. (2002). Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2002). Unforeseen contingencies. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2002). Unforeseen contingencies. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Merlo, Antonio (2002). Endogenous lobbying. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Postlewaite, Andrew (2001). Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Felli, Leonardo, Roberts, Kevin (2001). Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2000). Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2000). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? CESifo.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (2000). Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. (CEPR Discussion Paper 2030). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Costly bargaining and renegotiation. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Costly coasian contracts. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 300). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magne, Francois (1998). Technological Innovations Slumps and Booms. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP0394). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magné, François (1998). Technological innovations slumps and booms. (CEP Discussion Paper 394). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Ortalo-Magné, François (1997). Technological innovations: slumps and booms. (CARESS Working Paper 97-17). University of Pennsylvania.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1996). Costly contingent contracts. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Villas-Boas, J.M. (1996). Friendships in vertical relations. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Hortala-Vallve, R. (1996). Preventing collusion through discretion. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (1994). Job matching, learning and the distribution of surplus. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1993). Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1993). Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
    • This list was generated on Sun Mar 8 08:41:54 2026 GMT.