What do unions do to executive compensation?
Gomez, R. & Tzioumis, K.
(2006).
What do unions do to executive compensation?
(CEPDP CEPDP0720).
London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
In this paper we estimate the relation between union presence within a firm and CEO compensation, using a unique panel of publicly listed companies for the period 1992 to 2001. We find that, on average, union presence: 1) is significantly associated with lower levels of total CEO compensation; 2) affects the mix of CEO compensation by providing higher levels of base pay but much lower stock option values; 3) lowers dispersion across the major components of CEO remuneration and 4) does not significantly reduce the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as compared to non-union firms. These results are consistent with several models of union influence.
| Item Type | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2006 the authors |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Economic Performance |
| Date Deposited | 23 Jul 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19865 |
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