JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) K - Law and Economics (302) K1 - Basic Areas of Law (46) K12 - Contract Law (16)
Number of items at this level: 16.
2025
  • Paker, Meredith, Stephenson, Judy, Wallis, Patrick (2025). Nominal wage patterns, monopsony, and labour market power in early modern England. Economic History Review, 78(1), 179 - 206. https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13346 picture_as_pdf
  • Roy, Tirthankar, Swamya, Anand V. (2025). Development policy and legal persistence: evidence from India. Rivista di Storia Economica, 41(1), 95 - 116. https://doi.org/10.1410/116631
    • 2022
  • Bosio, Erica, Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward, Shleifer, Andrei (2022). Public procurement in law and practice. American Economic Review, 112(4), 1091 - 1117. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200738 picture_as_pdf
    • 2020
  • Bosio, Erica, Djankov, Simeon, Glaeser, Edward, Shleifer, Andrei (2020). Public procurement in law and practice. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 798). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
    • 2019
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni (2019). Costly pretrial agreements. Journal of Legal Studies, 48(1), 159 - 188. https://doi.org/10.1086/699841
  • Casaburi, Lorenzo, Macchiavello, Rocco (2019). Demand and supply of infrequent payments as a commitment device: evidence from Kenya. American Economic Review, 109(2), 523-555. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180281 picture_as_pdf
    • 2018
  • Donaldson, Jason Roderick, Micheler, Eva (2018). Resaleable debt and systemic risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 127(3), 485 - 504. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.005
    • 2017
  • Guimaraesy, Bernardo, Meyerhof Salama, Bruno (2017). Contingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury laws. (CFM discussion paper series CFM-DP2017-29). Centre For Macroeconomics.
    • 2016
  • Donaldson, Jason, Micheler, Eva (2016). Resaleable debt and systemic risk. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 53). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Paech, Philipp (2016). The governance of blockchain financial networks. (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 16/2017). Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2875487
    • 2013
  • Naidu, Suresh, Yuchtman, Noam (2013). Coercive contract enforcement: law and the labor market in nineteenth century industrial Britain. American Economic Review, 103(1), 107-144. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.107 picture_as_pdf
    • 2012
  • MacKenzie, Ian A., Ohndorf, Markus, Palmer, Charles (2012). Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring 'permanence' in carbon sequestration. Oxford Economic Papers, 64(2), 350 - 374. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpr057
    • 2010
  • MacKenzie, Ian A., Ohndorf, Markus, Palmer, Charles (2010). Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration. (Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 27). Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    • 2009
  • Palmer, Charles, Ohndorf, Markus, MacKenzie, Ian A. (2009). Life's a breach! Ensuring 'permanence' in forest carbon sinks under incomplete contract enforcement. (Economics working paper series no. 09/113). Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich.
    • 2008
  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto, Guriev, Sergei (2008). Control rights over intellectual property: corporate venturing and bankruptcy regimes. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 618). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • 2004
  • Hart, Oliver, Moore, John (2004). Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in. (TE 472). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.