JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (1374) C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (176) C70 - General (21) C71 - Cooperative Games (6) C72 - Noncooperative Games (60) C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games (29) C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory (36) C79 - Other (13)
Number of items at this level: 28.
2017
  • Madarász, Kristóf, Prat, Andrea (2017). Sellers with misspecified models. Review of Economic Studies, 84(2), 790 - 815. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw030
  • Marchiori, Carmen, Dietz, Simon, Tavoni, Alessandro (2017). Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 81, 115-131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.009
  • Salles, Maurice (2017). On Quine on Arrow. Social Choice and Welfare, 48(4), 877-886. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1042-z
  • 2016
  • Gong, Rui, Page, Frank (2016). Systemic risk and the dynamics of temporary financial networks. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 62). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Page, Frank (2016). On K-Class discounted stochastic games. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 61). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Page, Frank (2016). Stationary Markov equilibria for approximable discounted stochastic games. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 60). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • 2015
  • Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M., Holman, Nancy (2015). Distinctively different: a new approach to valuing architectural amenities. (SERC discussion papers SERCDP0171). Spatial Economics Research Centre.
  • Gentry, Matthew, Li, Tong, Lu, Jingfeng (2015). Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth. Games and Economic Behavior, 94, 214-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.003
  • Nava, Francesco (2015). Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 315-348. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.009
  • Page, Frank (2015). Parameterized games, minimal Nash correspondences, and connectedness. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 45). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Page, Frank (2015). Stationary Markov equilibria for K-class discounted stochastic games. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 44). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Page, Frank (2015). A fixed point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences arising in game theory. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers No 43). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • 2013
  • Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M., Holman, Nancy (2013). No escape? The co-ordination problem in heritage preservation. (SERC discussion papers SERCDP0145). Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC).
  • 2012
  • Dietz, Simon, Marchiori, Carmen, Tavoni, Alessandro (2012). Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements. (Climate Change and Sustainable Development 2012.076). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012). Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(2), 331-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4
  • 2011
  • Alpern, Steven (2011). Find-and-fetch search on a tree. Operations Research, 59(5), 1258-1268. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0966
  • Rothe, Jorn (2011). Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium in extensive games. In Petrosyan, Leon A., Zenkevich, Nikolay A. (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol Iv: the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management June 28-30, (pp. 389-406). St Petersburg University.
  • 2010
  • Rothe, Jorn (2010). Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium in normal form games. In Petrosyan, Leon A., Zenkevich, Nikolay A. (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol Iii: the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management June 24-26, (pp. 342-367). St Petersburg University.
  • 2009
  • Felsenthal, Dan S., Machover, Moshé (2009). A note on measuring voters’ responsibility. Homo Oeconomicus, 26(2), 259-271.
  • Rothe, Jorn (2009). Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium. In Petrosyan, Leon A., Zenkevich, Nikolay A. (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol Ii: the Second International Conference Game Theory and Management (pp. 363-382). St Petersburg University.
  • 2008
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea (2008). Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns. Journal of Economic Theory, 143(1), 83-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.005
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubenstein, Ariel (2008). Luxury prices: an expository note. Japanese Economic Review, 59(1), 127-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00413.x
  • 2007
  • Rothe, Jorn (2007). Book review: beyond individual choice: teams and frames in Game Theory, by Michael Bacharach, edited by Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden. Economica, 74(296), 870-871. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00601_4.x
  • 2006
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea (2006). Financial equilibrium with career concerns. Theoretical Economics, 1(1), 67-93.
  • 2005
  • Dasgupta, Amil, Prat, Andrea (2005). Asset price dynamics when traders care about reputation. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • 2004
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2004). The curse of wealth and power. Journal of Economic Theory, 117(1), 119-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.003
  • 2002
  • Dasgupta, Amil (2002). Financial contagion through capital connections: a model of the origin and spread of bank panics. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 436). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Piccione, Michele, Rubinstein, Ariel (2002). Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns. (Theoretical Economics; TE/2002/440 TE/02/440). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.