Xu, Cheng-Gang

Number of items: 37.
None
  • Maskin, Eric, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2007). Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. In Berglof, E. & Roland, G. (Eds.), The Economics of Transition : the Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics (pp. 12-36). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2006). Coordinating changes in transition economies. In Berglof, E. & Roland, G. (Eds.), The Economics of Transition: the Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics (pp. 518-546). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2006). Coordination and experimentation in M-Form and U-Form organizations. Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), 366-402. https://doi.org/10.1086/501170
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2005). Governing emerging stock markets: legal vs administrative governance. Corporate Governance: an International Review, 13(1), 5-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00398.x
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2005). Governing stock markets in transition economies : lessons from China. American Law and Economics Review, 7(1), 184-210. https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi008
  • Tong, Jian, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2004). Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2004). Beyond law enforcement - governing financial markets in China and Russia. In Kornai, J., Rothstein, B. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (Eds.), Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition (pp. 167-190). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Huang, Haizhou, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Financial syndication and R&D. Economics Letters, 80(2), 141-146.
  • Huang, Haizhou, Marin, Dalia, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Financial crisis, economic recovery and banking development in former Soviet Union economies. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Fiduciary duty in transitional civil law jurisdictions: lessons from the incomplete law theory. In Milhaupt, C. J. (Ed.), Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals (pp. 77-106). Columbia University Press.
  • Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Incomplete law. Journal of International Law and Politics, 35(4), 931-1013.
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001). Attribute coordination in organizations. Annals of Economics and Finance, 2(2), 487-518.
  • Maskin, Eric, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001). Soft budget constraint theories : from centralization to the market. Economics of Transition, 9(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00065
  • Maskin, Eric, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001). Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Robinson, Peter M., Chen, Xu, Linton, Oliver (2001). The estimation of conditional densities. In Puri, M. L. (Ed.), Asymptotics in Statistics and Probability - Papers in Honor of George Gregory Roussas (pp. 71-84). VSP International Science Publishers.
  • Maskin, Eric, Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2000). Incentives, information, and organizational form. Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359-378. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00135
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2000). Coordinating activities under alternative organizational forms. In Maskin, E. & Simonovits, A. (Eds.), Planning, Shortage, and Transformation : Essays in Honor of János Kornai (pp. 57-80). MIT Press.
  • Haizhou, Huang, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1999). Institutions, innovations, and growth. American Economic Review, 89(2), 438-443. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.438
  • Haizhou, Huang, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1999). Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia. European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 903-914. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00103-2
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1999). Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory. European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 1085-1094. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00116-0
  • Haizhou, Huang, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1998). Soft budget constraint and the optimal choices of research and development projects financing. Journal of Comparative Economics, 26(1), 62-79. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1997.1508
  • Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1998). Innovation and bureaucracy under soft and hard budget constraints. Review of Economic Studies, 65(1), 151-164. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00039
  • Xu, Cheng-Gang, Zhuang, Juzhong (1998). Why China grew: the role of decentralisation. In Boone, P., Gomulka, S. & Layard, R. (Eds.), Emerging From Communism : Lessons From Russia, China, and Eastern Europe (pp. 183-212). MIT Press.
  • Maskin, Eric, Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1997). Incentives, scale economies, and organizational form. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Zhuang, Juzhong, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1996). Profit-sharing and financial performance in the Chinese state enterprises: evidence from panel data. Economics of Planning, 29(3), 205-222. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00683949
  • Xu, Cheng-Gang, Weitzman, Martin L (1994). Chinese township village enterprises as vaguely defined cooperatives. Journal of Comparative Economics, 18(2), 121-145. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1994.1020
  • Xu, Cheng-Gang, Qian, Yingyi (1993). Why China's economic reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector. Economics of Transition, 1(2), 135 - 170. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.1993.tb00077.x
  • Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1993). The M-form hierarchy and China's economic reform. European Economic Review, 37(2-3), 541-548. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(93)90043-A
  • Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1993). Commitment, financial restraints, and innovation: market socialism reconsidered. In Bardhan, P. K. & Roemer, J. E. (Eds.), Market Socialism : the Current Debate (pp. 175-189). Oxford University Press.
    • Public
  • Tong, Jian, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2004). Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 484). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Tong, Jian, Chenggang, Xu (2004). Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gerard, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2003). Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Pistor, Katharina, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2002). Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bolton, Patrick, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001). Ownership and managerial competition: employee, customer, or outside ownership. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Bai, Chong-En, Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001). Ownership, incentives and monitoring. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Qian, Yingyi, Xu, Cheng-Gang (1993). Why China's economic reforms differ: the m-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector. (CEP discussion paper 154). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.