Joint know-how
When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an “active mutual enablement” (AME) account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such adjustments. I defend the AME account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an examination of the reducibility (or otherwise) of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge, whereas a distributive account is not (although serious difficulties for any such reduction remain). I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint know-how.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2018 The Author |
| Keywords | joint action, joint intention, coordination, cooperation, know-how intellectualism |
| Departments | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-018-1176-6 |
| Date Deposited | 31 Oct 2018 09:12 |
| Acceptance Date | 2018-09-07 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/90522 |
Explore Further
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/cpnss/people/jonathan-birch?from_serp=1 (Author)
- https://link.springer.com/journal/11098 (Official URL)
