The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India
Burgess, R.
& Besley, T.
(2002).
The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India.
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117(4), p. 1415.
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935061
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2002 The MIT Press. |
| Departments |
LSE > Research Centres > STICERD LSE > Academic Departments > Economics |
| DOI | 10.1162/003355302320935061 |
| Date Deposited | 15 Jun 2007 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/901 |
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- http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/study?globalId=hdl:1902.1/14384 (Dataset)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0036867094 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/qjec (Official URL)
-
Burgess, R.
& Besley, T.
(2010). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India [Dataset]. [Dataset]. Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/dvn/rmhj5k
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-1187-3248
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8923-6372