Costly pretrial agreements
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plaintiff files a lawsuit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2018 University of Chicago Press |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Economics |
| DOI | 10.1086/699841 |
| Date Deposited | 16 Jul 2018 |
| Acceptance Date | 13 Jul 2018 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/89255 |
Explore Further
- C79 - Other
- D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
- K12 - Contract Law
- K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/people/faculty/leonardo-felli.aspx (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85079486383 (Scopus publication)
- https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jls/current (Official URL)