More than ever, Congress was forming super-majorities to circumvent the possibility of a presidential veto when political interests were at stake
Fowler, L. & Marshall, B. W.
(2017).
More than ever, Congress was forming super-majorities to circumvent the possibility of a presidential veto when political interests were at stake.
While the President is seen as having the final say in all US policymaking, congressionally formed veto-proof supermajorities are occurred more frequently on important issues between 1981-2008. Data collected by Linda Fowler and Bryan W. Marshall examine the paradox this pattern presents; partisan divisions that traditionally made legislation difficult to pass also provided mechanisms for enhanced party control over floor proceedings to foster bipartisanship and constrain the president’s options.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2017 The Author(s) CC BY-NC 3.0 |
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 23 Jun 2017 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/82173 |