More than ever, Congress was forming super-majorities to circumvent the possibility of a presidential veto when political interests were at stake

Fowler, Linda; and Marshall, Bryan W. (2017) More than ever, Congress was forming super-majorities to circumvent the possibility of a presidential veto when political interests were at stake [Online resource]
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While the President is seen as having the final say in all US policymaking, congressionally formed veto-proof supermajorities are occurred more frequently on important issues between 1981-2008. Data collected by Linda Fowler and Bryan W. Marshall examine the paradox this pattern presents; partisan divisions that traditionally made legislation difficult to pass also provided mechanisms for enhanced party control over floor proceedings to foster bipartisanship and constrain the president’s options.


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