Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game

Savani, R. & von Stengel, B.ORCID logo (2004-10-17 - 2004-10-19) Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game [Paper]. 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2004), Rome, Italy, ITA.
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Item Type Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Copyright holders © 2004 the authors
Departments LSE > Academic Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited 19 Nov 2008
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/8140

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