International financial governance, the EU, and Brexit: the ‘agencification’ of EU financial governance and the implications

Moloney, N.ORCID logo (2016). International financial governance, the EU, and Brexit: the ‘agencification’ of EU financial governance and the implications. European Business Organization Law Review, 17(4), 451-480. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-016-0055-x
Copy

This article argues that the forces which shape how the EU engages with international financial governance are changing and that the implications for the EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally are significant. It suggests that this change is being driven by two related factors. First, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), with their distinct incentives, preferences, and powers, have recently come to prominence in international financial governance. Second, as international financial governance pivots from being preoccupied with standard-setting to becoming concerned with operational matters there is greater potential for influence to be exerted by administrative actors such as the ESAs. This article uses the European Securities and Markets Authority – which is the most active ESA internationally – as a case study for examining the implications of the availability of a technocratic administrative channel through which the EU can engage with international financial governance. It also offers some predictions as to the implications of the Brexit decision for the ESAs as international actors and for the UK’s interaction with international financial governance.

picture_as_pdf

picture_as_pdf
Moloney_International financial governance_Author_2016_LSERO.pdf
subject
Accepted Version

Download
picture_as_pdf

picture_as_pdf
Moloney_International financial governance_published_2016_LSERO.pdf
subject
Published Version
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0

Download

Export as

EndNote BibTeX Reference Manager Refer Atom Dublin Core JSON Multiline CSV
Export