Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems
Spinnewijn, J.
& Spinnewyn, F.
(2015).
Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems.
Review of Economic Design,
19(2), 91-116.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0168-7
& Spinnewyn, F.
(2015).
Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems.
Review of Economic Design,
19(2), 91-116.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0168-7
We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The mechanism incorporates two important features of negotiations; players can revise claims in an attempt to reach a compromise or pursue their claims in an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it offer. Players restrain their claims to avoid a weak bargaining position or their resistance to uncompromising behavior to acquire leadership. The Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are implemented in the extreme cases when respectively no and all revisions are allowed.