Black spiders weaving webs: the constitutional implications of executive veto of tribunal determinations

In R (Evans) v Attorney General, the Supreme Court quashed the Attorney General's statutory veto of the Upper Tribunal's original determination made under freedom of information legislation. The Upper Tribunal had held that so-called ‘advocacy’ memos should be published after a full hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court split five to two, with the lead judgment of Lord Neuberger using constitutional rather than administrative language and focusing on the rule of law. This note raises four objections to the lead judgment. First, it argues that the Upper Tribunal was acting in an executive not judicial capacity and the veto was not therefore a breach of the rule of law. Secondly it suggests the veto clause is best understood as a variant Henry VIII clause. Thirdly, it suggests Lord Neuberger's judgment is founded on a paradox. Finally, it argues that the judgment undermines parliamentary sovereignty. Future implications are then considered.