The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies
Brunnermeier, M. K., Garicano, L.
, Lane, P. R., Pagano, M., Reis, R.
, Santos, T., Thesmar, D., Van Nieuwerberg, S. & Vayanos, D.
(2016).
The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies.
American Economic Review,
106(5), 508-512.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161107
We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks’ domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio – known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2016 American Economic Association |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Economics |
| DOI | 10.1257/aer.p20161107 |
| Date Deposited | 24 Mar 2016 |
| Acceptance Date | 11 Jan 2016 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65863 |
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-9738-0945
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4844-9483
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0944-4914