Membership ballots and the value of intra-party democracy

On the face of it, membership ballots present a clear case in which intra-party democ-racy comes into collision with core principles of representative democracy: they weaken the autonomy of representatives, and undermine the authority of the voters. In this article, I investigate whether this is correct, and whether membership ballots are, therefore, democratically illegitimate, using the controversial 2013 Mitgliederentscheid in the German Social Democratic party as a critical case. I argue that there is nothing democratically suspect about membership ballots and mount a defence of intra-party democracy as intrinsically valuable, appealing to a principle of equal respect for persons as autonomous agents. It turns out that endorsing this prin-ciple has two possible implications: that the content of the ballot must be open to de-liberation, and that these deliberations should be rendered open to non-members. I discuss these implications and offer some institutional design guidelines.