Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting
Faure-Grimaud, A. & Inderst, R.
(2005).
Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting.
American Economic Review,
95(3), 850 - 861.
https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201260
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2005 American Economic Association |
| Departments |
LSE > Research Centres > Financial Markets Group LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1257/0002828054201260 |
| Date Deposited | 03 Jul 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/6376 |
Explore Further
- G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
- G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/30844460369 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ (Official URL)