Bargaining over new ideas: the distribution of rents and the stability of innovative firms

Razin, R.ORCID logo & Baccara, M. (2007). Bargaining over new ideas: the distribution of rents and the stability of innovative firms. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(6), 1095-1129. https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.6.1095
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Item Type Article
Copyright holders © 2007 MIT PRESS
Departments LSE > Academic Departments > Economics
DOI 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.6.1095
Date Deposited 02 Jul 2008
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/6335

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