Spectrum auctions: greed is good… if you do it well!
Dütting, P., Gkatzelis, V. & Roughgarden, T.
(2015-05-21)
Spectrum auctions: greed is good… if you do it well!
[Poster]. LSE Research Festival 2015, London, United Kingdom, GBR.
We devise a new auction mechanism for combinatorial auctions, such as the upcoming “incentive auctions” for re-allocating spectrum rights. Our mechanism achieves optimal social welfare subject to computability, and possesses an impressive list of incentive properties.
| Item Type | Conference or Workshop Item (Poster) |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2015 The Authors |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Mathematics |
| Date Deposited | 03 Aug 2015 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62912 |