Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
Naroditskiy, V. & Steinberg, R.
(2015).
Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution.
Games and Economic Behavior,
93, 24-41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010
It is well-known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2015 Elsevier Inc. |
| Departments | LSE |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010 |
| Date Deposited | 20 Jul 2015 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62771 |
Explore Further
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/management/people/academic-staff/rsteinberg.aspx (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84937862189 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08998... (Official URL)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9636-472X