Foreign aid encourages trade liberalization when given topolitically insecure leaders
Kono, D. Y. & Montinola, G. R.
(2015).
Foreign aid encourages trade liberalization when given topolitically insecure leaders.
Can foreign aid be a useful tool to promote trade liberalization? In new research which studies 66 autocracies over two decades, Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola find that foreign aid does encourage trade liberalization – but only in countries where leaders are politically insecure. They write that the less chance that an autocratic leader has of staying in power, the greater the effect of aid on tariff reductions.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2015 The Authors, USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog, The London School of Economics and Political Science. |
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 10 Jul 2015 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62666 |
