Corporate managers protect themselves at shareholders’expense with campaign spending to encourage states to passantitakeover legislation
Werner, Timothy
(2015)
Corporate managers protect themselves at shareholders’expense with campaign spending to encourage states to passantitakeover legislation.
[Online resource]
Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, which allowed corporations to make campaign contributions, much of the commentary on the ruling has centered on how it would affect election outcomes. But what has the impact been on policy outcomes? Timothy Werner argues that corporate managers will use the influence of their new spending ability to push for corporate governance laws that will protect their positions from competition. In new research which uses data from 38 states over 15 years, he finds that states are likely to pass one additional antitakeover law when corporate independent expenditures are allowed, and that this effect tends to occur when state legislators feel electorally vulnerable.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 13 May 2015 16:58 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61940 |
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