Emergent chance
This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. The article demonstrates that the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability can be drawn, and operationalized, at every level of description. There is, therefore, not a single distinction between objective and epistemic probability but a family of such distinctions
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2014 Cornell University |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Government LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-2812670 |
| Date Deposited | 25 Feb 2015 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61063 |
Explore Further
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/people/academic-staff/christian-list/home.aspx (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84923206788 (Scopus publication)
- http://philreview.dukejournals.org/ (Official URL)