Towards the end of any long-term incentive program for CEOs, the short term awaits – but it doesn’t need to be bad news
Xu, M.
(2014).
Towards the end of any long-term incentive program for CEOs, the short term awaits – but it doesn’t need to be bad news.
After the financial crisis, shareholders and regulators have become increasingly concerned about short-term pressures in business decision-making. Moqi Xu examines two potential remedies that firms use to set long-term incentives and what happens when they eventually run out. When long-term compensation eventually becomes available to executives, it rewards them for extremely short-term behaviour, such as timing news releases for their own personal benefit. When long-term employment contracts come close to the renewal decision, by contrast, executives are exposed to the scrutiny of the board, which forces them to focus and commercialize long-term investments previously made.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2014 The Author, USApp– American Politics and Policy Blog, The London School of Economics and Political Science |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Finance LSE > Research Centres > Financial Markets Group |
| Date Deposited | 03 Dec 2014 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60434 |