The political economy of the Greek debt crisis: a tale of two bailouts
Ardagna, S. & Caselli, F.
(2014).
The political economy of the Greek debt crisis: a tale of two bailouts.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
6(4), 291-323.
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.6.4.291
We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2014 American Economic Association |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Economic Performance |
| DOI | 10.1257/mac.6.4.291 |
| Date Deposited | 10 Nov 2014 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60112 |
Explore Further
- E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation
- F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
- H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
- H63 - Debt; Debt Management
- http://www.lse.ac.uk/economics/people/faculty/francesco-caselli.aspx (Author)
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84907952443 (Scopus publication)
- https://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/ (Official URL)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5191-7156