Government programs headed by recess appointees have poorer performance than those managed by non-recess appointees and careerists
American politics is polarized as never before, something that is also reflected in Congress. This polarization means that it has become increasingly difficulty for the Executive to gain approval for their government appointments in the Senate. One way that the President can circumvent this problem is to make appointments whilst the Senate is in recess. But what are the consequences of recess appointments? In new research, Susan M. Miller finds that government programs managed by recess appointees are associated with lower performance than those managed by non-recess appointments and career professionals. She argues that, in light of these findings, reforms such as last year’s move to limit the threat of filibuster for executive and some judicial positions may be a step in the right direction towards reducing the Executive’s need to make recess appointments.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2014 The Author |
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 17 Oct 2014 10:02 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59835 |