Sorting with motivated agents: implications for school competition and teacher incentives

Besley, T.ORCID logo & Ghatak, M.ORCID logo (2006). Sorting with motivated agents: implications for school competition and teacher incentives. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(2-3), 404-414. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.404
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Item Type Article
Copyright holders © 2006 MIT Press
Departments LSE > Academic Departments > Economics
LSE > Research Centres > STICERD
DOI 10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.404
Date Deposited 24 Jun 2008
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5906

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