The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections
Loewen, Peter; and Koop, Royce
(2014)
The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections
[Online resource]
It is generally accepted that constituents punish and reward their elected representatives at the ballot box for their legislative actions. But there is surprisingly little research on the link between politicians’ legislative activities and their chances of re-election. Using evidence from Canada, and by controlling for other influences on election vote shares, Peter Loewen and Royce Koop find that those MPs that are able to introduce legislation via private members (the ‘power to propose’) bills do reap a small reward in their subsequent elections.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 08 Aug 2014 13:30 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58798 |
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