The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections
Loewen, P. & Koop, R.
(2014).
The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections.
It is generally accepted that constituents punish and reward their elected representatives at the ballot box for their legislative actions. But there is surprisingly little research on the link between politicians’ legislative activities and their chances of re-election. Using evidence from Canada, and by controlling for other influences on election vote shares, Peter Loewen and Royce Koop find that those MPs that are able to introduce legislation via private members (the ‘power to propose’) bills do reap a small reward in their subsequent elections.
| Item Type | Online resource |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2014 The Authors |
| Departments | LSE |
| Date Deposited | 08 Aug 2014 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58798 |