Judgment aggregation without full rationality
Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein’s group identification problem.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2008 Springer |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Government LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-007-0260-1 |
| Date Deposited | 23 Jun 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5803 |
Explore Further
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/43749108854 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100385 (Official URL)