How should we aggregate competing claims?
Voorhoeve, Alex
(2014)
How should we aggregate competing claims?
Ethics, 125 (1).
64 - 87.
ISSN 0014-1704
Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords | distributive ethics,the numbers problem,rational choice theory,aggregation,sympathy |
| Departments | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1086/677022 |
| Date Deposited | 27 Feb 2014 10:02 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/55883 |
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ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3240-3835