Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market

Bar-Isaac, H. & Gavazza, A.ORCID logo (2013). Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market. (Rotman School of Management working paper 2205157). Social Sciences Research Network for Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.
Copy

We use new data from a rental brokers' multiple listings service to examine the contractual agreements between landlords and brokers. The data display two sources of variation in the way in which agents are compensated: 1) 69 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the other 31 percent are non-exclusive); and 2) in 23 percent of listings, landlords commit to pay the agent's fee (in the other 77 percent, the agent collects the fee from the tenant). We show that contracts vary according to apartment characteristics and market conditions. Specifically, landlords are more likely to sign exclusive agreements with agents for more-atypical apartments and are more likely to pay brokers' fees when apartments are in rent-stabilized buildings and when local vacancy rates are higher.

Full text not available from this repository.

Export as

EndNote BibTeX Reference Manager Refer Atom Dublin Core JSON Multiline CSV
Export