A general scoring rule
Gaertner, W. & Xu, Y.
(2012).
A general scoring rule.
Mathematical Social Sciences,
63(3), 193-196.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006
This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2012 Elsevier B.V. |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006 |
| Date Deposited | 21 Nov 2013 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54509 |
Explore Further
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84862791557 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.journals.elsevier.com/mathematical-soci... (Official URL)