A general scoring rule
Gaertner, Wulf; and Xu, Yongsheng
(2012)
A general scoring rule
Mathematical Social Sciences, 63 (3).
pp. 193-196.
ISSN 0165-4896
This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Departments | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006 |
| Date Deposited | 21 Nov 2013 11:57 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54509 |
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