Credible pensions
Besley, T.
& Prat, A.
(2005).
Credible pensions.
Fiscal Studies,
26(1), 119-135.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2005.00006.x
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Inc |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2005.00006.x |
| Date Deposited | 02 Jun 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5247 |
Explore Further
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/15844403110 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0143-5671 (Official URL)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8923-6372