Fair social orderings
Fleurbaey, M. & Maniquet, F.
(2007).
Fair social orderings.
Economic Theory,
34(1), 25-45.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4
In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2006 Springer-Verlag |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4 |
| Date Deposited | 06 Aug 2013 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51473 |