Does monitoring affect corruption? Career concerns and home bias in football refereeing
Rocha, B., Sanches, F. A., Souza, I. & Carlos Domingos da Silva, J.
(2013).
Does monitoring affect corruption? Career concerns and home bias in football refereeing.
Applied Economics Letters,
20(8), 728-731.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.736938
This article evaluates refereeing bias in football games. Using a data set for Brazilian Championship, we find that referees systematically favour home teams setting more extra time in close matches in which home teams are behind. Career concerns seem to be relevant, since monitoring inhibits this behaviour and the effect of the refereeing bias on the probability of scoring in the extra time is quantitatively negligible.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2013 Taylor & Francis |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Economics |
| DOI | 10.1080/13504851.2012.736938 |
| Date Deposited | 19 Mar 2013 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/49220 |