Equilibria in a class of games and topological results implying their existence

Simon, R. S., Spież, S. & Torunczyk, H. (2008). Equilibria in a class of games and topological results implying their existence. Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y Naturales. Serie A. Matematicas, 102(1), 161-179. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03191816
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We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.

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