Inefficient equilibria in lobbying
Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A.
(2001).
Inefficient equilibria in lobbying.
Journal of Public Economics,
82(3), 349-375.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1 |
| Date Deposited | 03 Apr 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4077 |
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