Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
Prat, A.
(2002).
Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies.
Journal of Economic Theory,
103(1), 162-189.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2793 |
| Date Deposited | 03 Apr 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4075 |
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