Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

Prat, Andrea Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103 (1). pp. 162-189. ISSN 1095-7235

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Item Type	Article
Keywords	campaign finance; common agency; elections
Departments	Economics STICERD
DOI	10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
Date Deposited	03 Apr 2008 10:12
URI	https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4075

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Prat, Andrea

HB Economic Theory

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