A study of collusion in first-price auctions

Pesendorfer, M.ORCID logo (2000). A study of collusion in first-price auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), 381-411. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00136
Copy
Item Type Article
Copyright holders © 2000 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.
Departments LSE > Academic Departments > Economics
LSE > Research Centres > STICERD
DOI 10.1111/1467-937X.00136
Date Deposited 01 Apr 2008
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4056

Explore Further

Full text not available from this repository.

Export as

EndNote BibTeX Reference Manager Refer Atom Dublin Core JSON Multiline CSV
Export

Downloads
View more statistics