Information structures in optimal auctions
Bergemann, D. & Pesendorfer, M.
(2007).
Information structures in optimal auctions.
Journal of Economic Theory,
137(1), 580-609.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2007 Elsevier Inc. |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001 |
| Date Deposited | 01 Apr 2008 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4054 |
Explore Further
- C72 - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
- D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- D44 - Auctions
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/36048952783 (Scopus publication)
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... (Official URL)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0547-8711