Why should it matter that others have more? Poverty, inequality, and the potential of international human rights law
A concern with ensuring minimum standards of dignity for all and a doctrine based on the need to secure for everyone basic levels of rights have traditionally shaped the way in which international human rights law addresses poverty. Whether this minimalist, non-relational approach befits international law objectives in the area of world poverty begs consideration. This article offers three justifications as to why global material inequality – and not just poverty – should matter to international human rights law. The article then situates requirements regarding the improvement of living conditions, a system of equitable distribution in the case of hunger, and in particular obligations of international cooperation, within the post-1945 international effort at people-centred development. The contextual consideration of relevant tenets serves to demonstrate that positive international human rights law can be applied beyond efforts at poverty alleviation to accommodate a doctrine of fair global distribution.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2011 British International Studies Association |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Law School LSE > Academic Departments > Sociology > LSE Human Rights |
| DOI | 10.1017/S0260210511000362 |
| Date Deposited | 14 Nov 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/39547 |
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