Do directors perform for pay?
Adams, R. B. & Ferreira, D.
(2008).
Do directors perform for pay?
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
46(1), 154-171.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002
Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996–2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising since meeting fees, on average roughly $1,000, represent an arguably small fraction of the total wealth of a representative director in our sample. Thus, corporate directors appear to perform for even very small financial rewards.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2008 Elsevier |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Finance |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002 |
| Date Deposited | 10 Nov 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/39400 |
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ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4590-8429