Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Gossner, OlivierORCID logo (2011) Simple bounds on the value of a reputation. Econometrica, 79 (5). pp. 1627-1641. ISSN 0012-9682
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We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.
Item Type Article
Keywords ISI,incomplete information,relative entropy,repeated games,reputation
Departments Mathematics
DOI 10.3982/ECTA9385
Date Deposited 17 Oct 2011 10:53
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/38927

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