Topological theories of social choice
Baigent, N.
(2010).
Topological theories of social choice.
In
Arrow, K., Sen, A. K. & Suzumura, K.
(Eds.),
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
(pp. 301-334).
Elsevier (Firm).
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7218(10)00018-3
This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
| Item Type | Chapter |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2010 Elsevier |
| Departments | LSE > Academic Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| DOI | 10.1016/S0169-7218(10)00018-3 |
| Date Deposited | 13 Oct 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/38787 |