Causation in the social sciences: evidence,inference, and purpose
Reiss, J.
(2009).
Causation in the social sciences: evidence,inference, and purpose.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
39(1), 20-40.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393108328150
All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. “Causal pluralism” is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2009 Sage |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0048393108328150 |
| Date Deposited | 08 Jun 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/36461 |
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