Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence
Besley, T.
& Preston, I.
(2007).
Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence.
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(4), 1473-1510.
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1473
This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.
| Item Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Departments |
LSE > Academic Departments > Economics LSE > Research Centres > STICERD |
| DOI | 10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1473 |
| Date Deposited | 30 Mar 2011 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/33745 |
Explore Further
- https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/37249013284 (Scopus publication)
- http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ (Official URL)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8923-6372