Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

Blanes i Vidal, JordiORCID logo (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0165-1765
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I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.
Item Type Article
Keywords delegation,winner's curse
Departments LSE
DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024
Date Deposited 21 Jan 2011 17:03
URI https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31523

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