Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model

(1992) Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model Economics Letters, 38 (4). pp. 479-486. ISSN 0165-1765

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A simple model of wage bargaining is developed. The firm knows the worker's productivity but the worker has only probabilistic information about his value to the firm. The worker acquires information by making wage demands and observing the resulting hiring/firing decisions of the firm. The firm acts strategically and distorts the worker's learning process.

Item Type	Article
Copyright holders	© 1992 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Departments	Management
DOI	10.1016/0165-1765(92)90037-Y
Date Deposited	02 Dec 2009 10:10
URI	https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/25990

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Reyniers, Diane J.

HB Economic Theory

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