The premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem are not simultaneously justified
Dietrich, F.
(2008).
The premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem are not simultaneously justified.
(LSE Choice Group working paper series vol. 4, no. 2).
The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics.
Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; (ii) none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
| Item Type | Working paper |
|---|---|
| Copyright holders | © 2008 The author |
| Departments | LSE > Research Centres > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS) |
| Date Deposited | 01 May 2009 |
| URI | https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/23847 |
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